“The International Sources of Democracy"

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Abstract

Liberal international relations theory proposes that peace fosters democracy. This research note tests this and a related hypothesis, that defeat in war makes an authoritarian state’s transition to democracy more likely. It uses Weibull event history models to analyze both the transition to and survival of democracy for states from 1960-1992, using the MID, COW, and Pearson/Baumann intervention data sets to measure international conflict. Important control variables such as economic prosperity are also included. It finds that lower levels of participation in international conflict do not facilitate democratic transition or survival, with the limited exception that participation in an international war blocks democratic transition. Also, in most models examined defeat in war does not make democratic transition more likely. The implications for liberalism are mixed: peace does not cause democracy, but we are more confident that spreading democracy will also spread peace.
Does international peace encourage the spread of democracy? Answering this question would both test liberal international relations theory, which forecasts reciprocal relationships among peace, democracy, trade, and international organization, and improve our general understanding of the sources of democratization. However, past empirical research on whether international peace breeds democracy has thus far been inconclusive. This research note expands our knowledge in this area by conducting quantitative empirical tests to explore the relationship between international conflict and democratization for all states from 1960-1992. The central proposition tested is that a peaceful international environment makes it more likely that democracy will emerge and survive. The paper also tests a secondary hypothesis, that an authoritarian state which loses war is more likely to experience a democratic transition. The paper improves on previous research by using event history analysis to conduct two separate tests, the first on the factors which raise the chances that an authoritarian state will make the transition to democracy, and the second on the factors which increase the risks that a democracy will revert to authoritarianism. This separation enables the distinction between two different processes, the transition to and survival of democracy. Additionally, the paper uses an appropriate level of analysis, includes important control variables (most notably economic prosperity), and reduces missing data problems. Lastly, the paper uses three different data sets to measure international conflict, which allows for a richer and more robust test.
The remainder of this research note proceeds in four parts. The first section presents the
theory and hypotheses which link peace to democracy. The second section presents the research
design. The third section presents results. The final section offers discussion and conclusions.

**World Politics and Democratization**

The essence of democracy is the institutionalization of procedures for the popular control
of leadership. As Adam Przeworski (1991, 10) pithily put it, “Democracy is a system in which
parties lose elections.” The question of when democracy will emerge and flourish is one of the
most important questions in comparative politics, and arguably one of the most central in all of
political science. Its salience has if anything risen in the 1990s, riding the tide of the end of the
Cold War and the emergence of a third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991). Democracy
has been trumpeted by academics and policy-makers alike as normatively desirable, because it is
thought to contribute to peace, bolster prosperity, expand trade, stop genocide, and, of course,
safeguard freedom. The theoretical and empirical literature on democratization is
comprehensive. Scholars have explored the links between democracy and cultural, economic,
institutional, social, and other factors (Huntington 1991; Feng and Zak 1999; Przeworski et al

It is important to distinguish between two phases of the democratization process: the
transition to democracy and the survival of democracy. The transition to democracy means the
movement from a system of authoritarian rule to one of institutionalized, democratic governance.
Significantly, a crucial part of the transition to democracy is convincing the former authoritarian
leaders to accept a political system which may leave them out of power (Przeworski 1991).
During the survival phase, newly installed democratic institutions are at first fragile; many new democracies fail to take root. Society may revert to authoritarianism if newly elected democratic leaders exploit their power at the expense of democratic institutions, or if those left out of power seek to regain control by destroying these new institutions (Przeworski 1991; Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Successful democratic transitions are characterized by the institutionalization and legitimization of democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996, 5). Though some claim that at a certain point democracies become “consolidated,” it is more useful to examine instead the length of democratic survival, as determining objectively a point at which democracies become “consolidated” and no longer risk breakdown is difficult. For example, in the Power and Gasiorowski (1997, 152-3) data set on democratic consolidation, there were 17 states which met all three consolidation criteria, holding a post-founding election, experiencing an alternation in power, and surviving twelve years without democratic breakdown. Of these 17, more than one third (six) eventually experienced democratic breakdown anyway. Przeworski et al (1996, 50) viewed the very concept of democratic consolidation as an “empty term.”

How can the international system affect democratization (see Whitehead 1996, Gourevitch 1978)? A central factor is the peacefulness of the international environment. Immanuel Kant (1991, 49) proposed that the practice of war precludes the moral maturation which culminates in civic republicanism: “But as long as states apply all their resources to their vain and violent schemes of expansion, thus incessantly obstructing the slow and laborious efforts of their citizens to cultivate their minds, and even deprive them of all support in these efforts, no progress in this direction can be expected.”

Participation in international conflict can both delay an authoritarian state’s transition to democracy and lead to a democracy’s breakdown (see Thompson 1996). Democratic transition
models claim that the central hurdle of democratization is convincing authoritarian leaders to yield their control in favor of a new system which may push them out of power. Past research has focused on how domestic factors, such as economic crisis, standard of living, and cultural demand for individual liberties might affect the leadership’s decision to accept democratic reforms (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Huntington 1991). However, international factors can also affect the calculus of an authoritarian leadership, pushing it away from accepting the risks and uncertainty of a leap to democracy, or a new democratic leadership, encouraging it to abandon the democratic experiment and return to repression. The specter of war or a bid for empire can strengthen the hand of the state at the expense of social freedom and prospects for liberal democratic reforms, as external threat or participation in war can encourage the leadership to centralize political power and crush opposition to swiftly mobilize societal resources for war without obstruction (Gurr 1998; Rasler 1986). Additionally, high levels of external threat can raise the political profile of the military and potentially transform society into a garrison state, that is, an undemocratic political system dominated by the armed forces (Lasswell 1997).

The question of whether peace causes democracy has broader implications for international relations in general. A central theme of international relations scholarship in the last decade has been the exploration of how democracy affects international relations, focusing in particular on its pacifying effects. One challenge to the proposition that democracies are unlikely to fight each other is the argument that peace creates democracy rather than vice versa (Thompson 1996; James, Solberg, and Wolfson 1999). Alternatively, modern liberals have laid out theoretical models which predict reciprocal causality, that democracy and peace both drive each other within a broader framework in which peace, democracy, international organization, and trade are all mutually reinforcing (Oneal and Russett n.d.). Others have pointed to the
reciprocal relationship between democracy and peace as the dynamic which establishes the communities envisioned by integration theory (Gleditsch 2000). The potential of a reciprocal relationship between peace and democracy is integral to the vision of a perpetual peace envisioned by Kant, whose ideas constitute crucial foundations of modern liberalism. In his “Idea for a Universal History,” he (1991, 47) wrote that, “The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved unless the latter is also solved” (emphasis in original).

This paper examines two processes, the transition from autocracy to democracy and the reversion of democracy to autocracy. The general logic linking peace to democracy ought to apply to both, that is, peace ought to make authoritarian states more likely to accept democratic reforms and it ought to extend democratic survival. For democratic transitions, the question is whether a conflictual international environment will dissuade authoritarian leaders from making the risky leap to institutionalizing democratic reforms. For democratic survival, the question is whether the specter of war will cause democratic governments to crack down on dissent and cancel elections in order to facilitate the war effort.

**Hypothesis 1:** Higher levels of participation in international conflict make an authoritarian state’s transition to democracy less likely.

**Hypothesis 2:** Higher levels of participation in international conflict make a democracy’s reversion to authoritarianism more likely.

I also test a third hypothesis. Mitchell et al (1999) hypothesized that war causes democracy, specifically because democracies frequently defeat authoritarian states in war (Reiter and Stam 1998), and when they do the defeated autocracies become democratic either because they are forced to do so by the democratic victors or because their own societies demand
democratic reforms. Their study coded the annual incidence of war and democracy at the systemic level. Here, using the nation as the unit of analysis enables us to test a narrower hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 3: Authoritarian states which lose wars are more likely to become democratic.**

The quantitative empirical evidence on the effect of peace on democracy contain mixed findings. James, Solberg, and Wolfson (1999) and Gleditsch (2000) found that peace spreads democracy. Conversely, Mitchell et al (1999) found that war causes democracy, while Mousseau and Shi (1999), Pevehouse (1999), and Oneal and Russett (2000) found there to be no connection. This paper offers improvements in research design over previous quantitative studies. First, it uses a more precise unit of analysis, the individual nation (note that there is no reverse causal effect when the unit of analysis is the nation; democracies are not more or less likely to participate in a dispute (Dassel and Reinhardt 1999)). James, Solberg, and Wolfson (1999) focus on how the level of conflict within a dyad affects the democratization of the dyad; however, this provides only a limited view of the total amount of conflict a nation participates in during a particular year. Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre (1999) used the total amount of war and democracy in the system in a given year, aggregating the experiences of all states together, which precludes more precise tests. Mousseau and Shi (1999) used the nation, but they limit their analysis to only those states which actually participated in wars. Second, this study includes crucial control variables. Most other tests of the peace-democracy hypothesis fail to include the national level variables which the comparative literature has long argued to be important. A few unpublished papers have included some control variables (eg, Pevehouse 1999; Gleditsch 2000), but their use of conventional data sources means substantial missing data, an especially important lacuna for this question because it is mostly Communist countries which
get omitted. This paper collects new data (discussed in greater detail below), allowing the missing data problem to be substantially reduced. Third, this paper distinguishes between the transition and survival phases, allowing more precise discernment of how peace does and does not affect democratization.

Research Design and Data

This paper uses a Weibull event history model to examine the effects of peace on democratization and democratic survival. For democratic transitions, the analysis is of the factors which hasten an authoritarian state’s transition to democracy--the end of its phase as an authoritarian state--and for democratic survival the analysis is of the factors which hasten a democracy’s reversion to authoritarianism--the end of its phase as a democracy. Such an approach usefully accounts for how long a state has spent in a democratic or authoritarian phase, thereby directly modeling temporal autocorrelation. Conducting separate analyses of democratic transitions and democratic survival also allows for the possibility that the same factor may have one effect in the transition phase and a different one in the survival phase. A number of papers have used event history analysis to examine democratic transitions, democratic consolidations, and regime changes (see, for example, Gasiorowski 1995; Feng and Zak 1999; Pevehouse 1999). Here, democratic transition and autocratic reversion will be analyzed separately.

I analyze all states from 1960-1992 for which the Polity 98 data set provides data, which has been described to include all nations with at least 500,000 in population in the early 1990s (Jaggers and Gurr 1995, 470). Polity 98 is especially appropriate here, as most “democracy causing peace” and all of the “peace causing democracy” scholarship uses Polity. I collect data
on an annual basis, to allow for time-varying covariates. The years 1960-1992 were used to minimize missing data problems, specifically the decreasing availability of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita data before 1960 and international conflict data after 1992. To measure democratic transitions and survival, I used the Polity 98 data set (available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity; on a precursor to Polity 98, see Jaggers and Gurr 1995). Specifically, I create a Polity score for each state which consists of its 0-10 Autocracy score subtracted from its 0-10 Democracy score, providing a combined score ranging from –10 (least democratic) to +10 (most democratic). Both the Autocracy and Democracy scores are based on a variety of component measures, including competitiveness of political participation, regulation of political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. To facilitate event history analysis, it is necessary to convert this score to a dichotomous variable. I code states as being democratic if they received a score of 7 or higher on the –10 to 10 scale (on the importance of using a dichotomous measure of democracy, see Alvarez et al 1996). Gleditsch and Ward (1997, 381) lean against recommending using thresholds to classify states as democratic or not. However, they do argue that the Executive Constraints Polity variable which is a component of the Democracy and Autocracy scores is a strong determinant of whether or not a state is democratic, and if one uses the 7 or higher threshold for this time period all democracies get an Executive Constraints score of 5 or higher on a 1-7 scale, and no democracies get an Executive Constraints score of 4 or lower. The 7 threshold also follows the recommendation of Jaggers and Gurr (1995, 479), and is used in other empirical work, such as Pevehouse (1999) and Rousseau et al (1996). There is no natural cutpoint below 7; all cells below 7 (until –5) contain less than 2% of the population, where an even distribution would give each cell about 4.5% (given that there are

I use three data sets to measure international conflict. The first is the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set, which records all militarized interstate disputes from 1816-1992, a MID being defined as an event in which there is the threat, display, or use of military force between two or more recognized members of the international system (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). The measure of conflict is the number of MIDs the state participates in during the year in question. Second, I use the Correlates of War (COW) data set on international wars. Such wars are conflicts causing at least 1000 battle deaths, and they include both conflicts between states (inter-state wars) and conflicts between states and non-state entities such as colonies (extra-systemic wars) (Singer and Small 1994). This variable is coded 1 if the state participated in an international war during the year in question, 0 otherwise. The third is the “International Military Intervention, 1946-1988” data set (Pearson and Baumann 1993, 1). This data set includes all instances of “military intervention across international boundaries by regular armed forces of independent states. ...Military interventions are defined operationally in this collection as the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country into the territory or territorial waters of another country, or forceful military action by troops already stationed by one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute.” I use this data set to produce two variables: one is the count of the number of countries which have intervened against the country in question during the year in question, and the second
is the total number of interventions the country in question participated in during that year, whether as target or intervener. These two variables get at different conceptions of conflict participation, the first measuring the degree to which the country is being targeted by outside states, and the second measuring the country’s participation in international violence, whether as an aggressor or as a target. Including a variable which counts only instances of being targeted is useful, as one interpretation of the theoretical logic linking peace to democracy might posit that societies would accept crackdowns and repression in response to threats to the national homeland, but would not in response to imperial or revisionist militarist ventures. To measure loss in war for Hypothesis 3, I include a dummy variable which is coded 1 if the state lost a COW interstate war (Mitchell et al (1999: 780) also use COW interstate wars in their analysis) in the current or previous year, 0 otherwise.

I also include a number of control variables (see Feng and Zak 1999; Huntington 1991; Przeworski et al 1996). Economic prosperity variables are especially important. Unfortunately, complete time series for these variables even for the relatively recent time span of 1960-1992 are not available. This paper assembled as nearly complete time series as possible for these variables using real GDP per capita (purchasing power parity (PPP)) in 1985 dollars from a variety of sources. The core source was the frequently-used Penn World Tables (Summers and Heston 1991). However, for all country-years (where Peru 1978, for example, is a single country-year) of all COW members of the international system from 1960-1992, Penn World Tables 5.6 provides (PPP) GDP per capita data for only 65% of the cases. These gaps are especially troubling for studies of international conflict, because many of the excluded countries are communist bloc nations in East Europe and elsewhere. The World Bank’s (1999) World Development Indicators data base fills some gaps. I also filled in gaps for Cuba, Eastern Europe,
and North Korea using other sources (Zimbalist and Brundenius 1989; Kornai 1992; Hwang 1993), providing (PPP) GDP per capita data on 89% of all cases (adjusted to 1985 dollars). I use the log of real GDP per capita to reflect the curvilinear nature of the relationship. I also include as a separate variable the real annual growth in per capita GDP.

Some have speculated that culture affects democratization, specifically that democracy is less likely to flourish in cultures which emphasize authority and do not emphasize individual initiative and prerogative. In particular, it has been speculated that predominantly Muslim societies may be less likely to become and remain democratic (Huntington 1991). I include a measure of the percentage of Muslims in each society, using Barnett (1982).

Lastly, I include one international control variable. Several scholars have speculated that one’s own regime type is affected by the regime type of one’s neighbors (Gleditsch 2000; Huntington 1991). For each country, I code the percentage of other democracies in its region during that year. I divide the world into the following regions using COW codings: the Americas, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia/Oceania.

Results

I conduct two sets of analyses in this section, the first on the factors which cause the transformation of authoritarian states into democracies, and the second on the factors which cause the transformation of democracies into authoritarian states. Again, both sets of analyses use a Weibull event history model for the years 1960-1992. Note that for both analyses, I measure the true duration of the regime type from the (if applicable) pre-1960 beginning of its authoritarian or democratic phase rather than measuring duration from 1960. That is, if an
authoritarian state emerged in 1950 and it becomes democratic in 1965, I code its duration as 15 years rather than 5 years. Assuming 5 year duration would risk bias because of theoretically inappropriate left truncation. If there has been a political interruption, interregnum, or transition (Polity 98 scores of –66, -77, or –88), I begin a new period at the end of this phase, rather than code it as a single panel including both the pre- and post-interlude periods.

Table 1 presents analysis of the factors which affect the transition to democracy. The data set includes all authoritarian state-years from 1960-1992.

Model 1 includes all variables and the Dispute measure of international conflict. Neither the Dispute or Lose War variables are statistically significant, meaning that neither avoiding participation in international disputes nor defeat in war hastened the transition of authoritarian states to democracy (Lose War remains insignificant if the Disputes variable is dropped from the model, or if we code the variable as 1 if there has been a lost war within time periods longer than the past 2 years). Among the control variables, Logged GDP/capita and Regional Democracy are significant, and Islam and Growth are not. In Models 2 and 3, I use as measures of conflict whether or not the state in question has been the target of intervention, and whether the state has participated in intervention as target or aggressor. Neither Conflict or the Lose War variable is significant here, either, with the exception that Lose War is barely statistically significant (p=.05, one-tailed test) in Model 2; this limits the robustness of the null result for Lose War. This variable becomes significant in Model 2 probably because the years 1989-1992 are excluded here (because of temporal limits on data for the intervention variable), and these years include a number of democratic transitions which occurred without being preceded by loss in war. The overall null result on threat is more robust: it holds if I instead use a one year lagged value of
MID participation, use the cumulative count of MID (or intervention) participation over the last three, five, or ten years instead of just the current year, count only those MIDs which escalate to the use of force (scores of 4 or 5 for the MID hostility variable), take the square root of MID or intervention participation as a means of reducing the effect of possible outliers, exclude major powers from the analysis, or use a Cox instead of a Weibull model.

The last measure of conflict is participation in war, used in Model 4. In this model, Lost War is omitted because of collinearity. Here, conflict as measured by participation in war is significant (and remains so even if the Lost War variable is included): an autocracy is significantly less likely to become democratic while it is fighting an international war. Indeed, from 1960-1992 no state underwent a democratic transition in the same year it was fighting a war. This result is narrow; if we use instead measures which count the number of years of participation in war over the last three, five, or ten years, they are insignificant. In sum, it is only at the highest level of conflict, when a state is currently engaged in a military conflict which incurs at least 1000 casualties, that democratic transition is blocked. Note in contrast that participation in international crises (Model 1) or interventions (Models 2 and 3) are insufficient to delay democratization.

Table 2 presents the analysis of the factors which affect democratic survival. The data include all democratic state-years from 1960-1992.

[Table 2 about here]

In Model 5, Disputes are used as the measure of threat. It is not significant and remains so if different measures of threat are used, such as counting the number of disputes in the last 3 or 5 years. Among the control variables, Logged GDP/capita and Islam were significant, and Growth and Regional Democracy were not. In Models 6 and 7, I use the two Intervention variables as
measures of threat; neither is significant. In Model 8, I use war participation as a measure of threat, and it is statistically significant, but the sign is not in the predicted direction. These findings are robust, as levels of international conflict remain insignificantly related to democratic consolidation even with the different operationalizations of the Dispute and Intervention variables described above.

Conclusions

This paper has tested the hypothesis that peace nurtures democracy. The results show that only the highest level of international conflict, current participation in international war, significantly reduces the chances that a state will make the transition to democracy. These null findings are mostly consistent with Oneal and Russett (2000), Pevehouse (1999), and Mousseau and Shi (1999), and are mostly inconsistent with Thompson (1996) and James, Wolfson, and Solberg (1999). This fits in with the general theoretical framework which sees democratic transitions as possible when authoritarian leaders are brave enough to open their political systems to genuine competition. During war, autocrats may be less willing to expose themselves to the dangers of domestic political competition. However, this effect is significant only at high levels of conflict; participation in disputes or interventions does not reduce the chances of democratic transitions, and the War variable was not significant when war participation over the past few years was used as the measure. Additionally, increased threat was not found to cause democratic breakdown, using any measure of conflict. This second finding bolsters our confidence in the robustness of democracy, as once in place it cannot be subverted by international conflict or even fighting a war. Finally, it was found that for the 1960-1992 time
period loss in war did not affect the transition to democracy, though when that time period was truncated to end in 1988 loss in war did make democratization more likely for one of the intervention variables. This general null finding casts some doubt on the claim that defeat in war makes democratization more likely.

These findings are important because they use a research design which has some advantages over those used in the past. The democratic transition and survival phases were examined separately, and this distinction paid off in the discovery that war participation has a significant effect on transition but not survival. The nation was used as the unit of analysis, enabling more precise and accurate tests. Event history was used to account for temporal dependence. Important control variables were included, and missing data problems were substantially reduced.

Beyond improving our understanding of the causes of democratization, the results here have broader implications for the liberal peace. We have robust evidence that there is a very limited effect of peace on democracy, specifically that only participation in war delays the transition to democracy. Note that contrary to the claims of some critics, this finding probably does not undermine the reverse causal arrow, the proposition that democracies do not fight each other, given that the peace created by democracies amongst themselves (the democratic peace finding) does not in turn help democracies survive (the results in Table 2). Further, the peace generated by democracies is only among themselves, meaning that the spread of democracy does not reduce the level of conflict experienced by authoritarian regimes, so there is no indirect effect of democracy causing peace causing democracy.
Table 1: Weibull Analysis of the Transition to Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disputes (MID)</td>
<td>-.269</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.170)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention, Targets Only (Pearson/Baumann)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-.0630</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.208)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention, Total (Pearson/Baumann)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-.0284</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.148)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wars (COW)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-15.2***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.535)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lose War</td>
<td>.382</td>
<td>1.95*</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.61)</td>
<td>(1.18)</td>
<td>(1.31)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Democracy</td>
<td>4.81***</td>
<td>5.74**</td>
<td>5.73**</td>
<td>5.26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
<td>(2.32)</td>
<td>(2.32)</td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/cap (logged)</td>
<td>.468**</td>
<td>.656**</td>
<td>.663**</td>
<td>.453**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(2.40)</td>
<td>(2.46)</td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>-.0255</td>
<td>-.0331</td>
<td>-.0338</td>
<td>-0.0112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.224)</td>
<td>(0.499)</td>
<td>(0.496)</td>
<td>(0.218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>-.000439</td>
<td>.00566</td>
<td>.00557</td>
<td>.00208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00892)</td>
<td>(.00964)</td>
<td>(.00937)</td>
<td>(.00730)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-7.13***</td>
<td>-8.61***</td>
<td>-8.68**</td>
<td>-7.21***</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.40)</td>
<td>(1.54)</td>
<td>(1.55)</td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-109.29214</td>
<td>-76.262731</td>
<td>-76.288178</td>
<td>-107.78603</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subjects</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Transitions (Failures)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Coefficients reported, robust standard errors in parentheses, with clustering on the country. Prob>chi2 = .0000 for all models. *sig at .05 level; **sig at .01 level; *** sig at .001 level. All significance tests one-tailed.
Table 2: Weibull Analysis of the Survival of Democracy, 1960-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disputes (MID)</td>
<td>-.249 (.437)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention, Targets Only (Pearson/Baumann)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-.758 (.660)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention, Total (Pearson/Baumann)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-.0836 (.256)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wars (COW)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-20.7• (.654)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Democracy</td>
<td>4.07 (3.49)</td>
<td>1.73 (3.52)</td>
<td>1.67 (3.34)</td>
<td>4.39 (3.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/cap (logged)</td>
<td>-1.86*** (.371)</td>
<td>-1.81*** (.263)</td>
<td>-1.69*** (.334)</td>
<td>-1.89*** (.363)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>-.385 (1.28)</td>
<td>-.0235 (1.07)</td>
<td>-.0747 (1.15)</td>
<td>-.471 (1.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>.0184** (.00726)</td>
<td>.0192* (.00752)</td>
<td>.0185* (.00874)</td>
<td>.0190** (.00767)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>8.10*** (1.96)</td>
<td>7.76*** (1.46)</td>
<td>7.06*** (2.04)</td>
<td>8.13*** (2.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1277</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>1277</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subjects</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>63</td>
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<td>Democratic Breakdowns (Failures)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>16</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Coefficients reported, robust standard errors in parentheses, clustering on country.***significant at .001 level. **significant at .01 level. * significant at .05 level.
•significant at .05 level, but not in predicted direction. All significance tests are one-tailed. For all models, Prob>chi2 = .0000;
References


*Comparative Political Studies* 21 (April): 45-65.


